University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 49

Number 1

Article 10

2018

Recent Developments: SVF Riva Annapolis, LLC v. Gilroy
Klara Kim

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Klara (2018) "Recent Developments: SVF Riva Annapolis, LLC v. Gilroy," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 49 : No. 1 , Article 10.
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol49/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT


SVF RIVA ANNAPOLIS, LLC V. GILROY: THE POSSESSION AND
CONTROL EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IS NOT
LIMITED TO CASES INVOLVING EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS.

By: Klara Kim
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that injuries caused by
improvements to real property are barred by a 20-year statute of limitations
except for cases involving exposure to asbestos and to any defendants that are
in possession and control of the property as owner, tenant, or otherwise. SVF
Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy, 459 Md. 632, 655, 187 A.3d 686, 700 (2018).
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the language of Maryland’s statute of
repose and its structure separated the listed exceptions. Id. In analyzing the
statutory language, Maryland courts first look to the plain meaning of the
language in the statute and will only analyze the legislative history if the
language is ambiguous. Id. at 645-46, 187 A.3d at 694-95.
On January 12, 2012, the decedent, Sean McLaughlin (“Mr. McLaughlin”)
arrived at the Chuck E. Cheese (“CEC”) restaurant located in Festival at Riva
Shopping Center in Annapolis to repair a HVAC unit located on the rooftop
of the restaurant. Mr. McLaughlin ascended towards the building’s roof using
a ladder that was placed on one of the exterior walls of the CEC. After Mr.
McLaughlin reached the top, he mounted the wall and fell 20 feet to the
concrete pad on the other side. Mr. McLaughlin sustained severe injuries and
died 12 days later.
After the death of Mr. McLaughlin, his estate, Moreen Elizabeth Gilroy
and other survivors (“Gilroy”) filed a wrongful death suit against SVF Riva
Annapolis, LLC (“SVF”), the owner of the shopping center where Chuck E.
Cheese was located. Gilroy’s suit alleged negligence and premises liability,
arguing SVF was liable in failing to warn McLaughlin that the wall had no
roof access. SVF moved to have the case dismissed, arguing the statute of
repose barred Gilroy’s claims since the building had been constructed more
than 20-years before the accident.
The circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants allowing the claims to be
barred under § 5-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”)
finding that the exceptions to the statutes 20-year limitation were only
applicable to cases involving asbestos. Gilroy, 459 Md. at 643, 160 A.3d at
692. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding the
possession and control exception was not limited to asbestos cases, but to any
claims in which the defendant had actual possession and control of the
property. Id. at 638, 187 A.3d at 690. The Court of Appeals granted writ of
certiorari to address the proper statutory interpretation of § 5-108 CJP. Id.
The court began its analysis by looking at the plain language of the statute.
Gilroy, 459 Md. at 641, 160 A.3d at 692. The court stated that the proper
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interpretation of the statute turned on use of the conjunction “or”. Id. at 643,
187 A.3d at 692. When Maryland legislators have used “or,” the meaning is
commonly disjunctive and the two bodies of text are taken independently. Id.
The court continued its analysis by considering the different approaches
taken by Maryland courts in handling cases involving CJP § 5-108. Gilroy,
459 Md. at 644, 160 A.3d at 694. The court acknowledged that Maryland
courts had not yet analyzed the possession and control exception outside the
context of asbestos-related claims. Gilroy, 459 Md. at 644, 160 A.3d at 69394 (citing Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 643 A.2d 906 (1994);
Hagerstown Elderly Assoc. Ltd P’ship v. Hagerstown Elderly Bldg. Assocs.
Ltd. P’ship, 368 Md. 351, 793 A.2d 579 (2002). Nonetheless, the court
emphasized that the possession and control exception was independent from
the asbestos exceptions. Id. The court stated that the proximity of the three
asbestos exceptions should not limit the applicability of the possession and
control exception to asbestos related claims. Id. at 645, 187 A.3d at 694.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the broad
protection offered in §5-108(a) protected all classes of defendants unless they
were recognized by one of the four exceptions. Gilroy, 459 Md. at 644, 160
A.3d at 693. The court noted that the named defendants had control and
possession of the real property, and therefore, the 20-year limitation imposed
by the statute of repose did not apply to bar Gilroy’s claims. Id. at 644, 187
A.3d at 693-94. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the lower court’s
decision and agreed that the possession and control exception to the 20-year
statute of repose was not limited to asbestos cases, and was applicable to any
defendant in actual control or possession of the property. Id. at 639-40, 187
A.3d at 691.
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland assessed both the Petitioner’s
and Respondent’s reliance on the legislative history of § 5-108. The court
began its analysis by looking at the original legislative body and the
subsequent amendments that passed through the Legislature. Gilroy, 459 Md.
at 649, 160 A.3d at 696. First, the court pinpointed that the original statue of
1970 did not include any mention of asbestos, but had a possession and control
exception. Id. Looking at the amendments made in 1973, 1979, and 1980, the
possession and control exception to the statute was present; however, the
legislators had not yet adopted the asbestos exceptions. Id. at 649, 187 A.3d at
697. Finally, the court looked at the final amendment passed in 1991, which
first introduced the three asbestos exceptions. Id. The court explained that the
policy behind the “asbestos amendments” was to allow plaintiffs to seek relief
for latent injuries related to asbestos exposure beyond the 20-year limitation
imposed by the statute of repose. Id. The court finally stated that there was no
support in the legislative history linking the asbestos exceptions to the
possession and control exception. Id. at 652-53, 187 A.3d at 698-99.
In Gilroy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied statutory analysis to
hold that the four exceptions to the statute of repose were not limited to
asbestos-related claims. Therefore, the 20-year limitation imposed by the
statute of repose will not shield defendants that are in possession and control
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of the property. This decision may result in increased litigation because
plaintiffs who were injured by a defective or unsafe condition resulting from
the improvements to real property may have assumed the statute precluded
their non-asbestos claims. However, this holding affirms that the possession
and control exception eliminates the statute’s protection for defendants in
possession and control of real property.

